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ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL NETWORKING*
SPENCER WEBER WALLER**
IBM. AT&T. Microsoft. Intel. IBM (redux). Google. Twitter.
Facebook. These firms all have been the subject of actual or
rumored antitrust scrutiny over the past three decades. All are (or
were) leaders in key high-tech sectors. All have been referred to
as "monopolies" in the colloquial sense, and in the more
technical antitrust sense, and each has been the target of public
and private investigation and/or antitrust litigation relating to
monopolization, attempted monopolization, or the abuse of a
dominant position in the United States, the European Union, the
E. U. member states, and other jurisdictions.
The goal of this Article is to create a framework to analyze the
competition law concerns of social networking sites. It may well
be too early to definitely resolve the many antitrust issues in this
rapidly evolving market, but it is not too soon to begin to define
the issues and analyze the way they will be resolved as antitrust
law undertakes its traditional role of defining and limiting the
abuse of market power in key high-tech industries. More
generally, I seek to create an antitrust framework to understand
and evaluate continuing issues of network effects, essential
facilities, infrastructure, and their application to social
networking sites, software platforms, and the interactive web. I
also deal with the added complication that most of the markets in
question do not currently charge consumers and exhibit features
of what economists call two-sided markets. I conclude not with a
call to action, but more of a checklist to look to in order to
determine what issues matter most and which of our current
market leaders have the greatest antitrust risks as online social
networking continues to evolve and grow in importance.
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INTRODUCTION
IBM. AT&T. Microsoft. Intel. IBM (redux). Google. Twitter.
Facebook. All are present or former leaders in key high-tech sectors.
These firms also have been the subject of serious antitrust scrutiny
over the past three decades. All have been referred to at different
times as "monopolies" in the colloquial sense and in the more
technical antitrust sense. They also have been the target of public and
private investigations and litigation relating to monopolization,
attempted monopolization, or the abuse of a dominant position in the
United States, the European Union ("E.U."), the E.U. member
states, and other jurisdictions.
This Article focuses on social networking sites as the most recent
locus of these competition issues and seeks to create a framework to
analyze the competition law concerns of social networking sites. It
may well be too early to definitively resolve the many antitrust issues
in this rapidly evolving market, but it is not too soon to define the
issues and analyze how they will be resolved as antitrust law
undertakes its traditional role of defining and limiting the abuse of
market power in key high-tech industries.' I also seek to create a
1. See generally Spencer Weber Waller, Access and Information Remedies in High-
Tech Antitrust, J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers
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framework to understand and evaluate from an antitrust perspective
continuing issues of network effects, essential facilities, infrastructure,
and their application to social networking sites and related software
platforms, taking into account the added complication that most of
the markets in question do not currently charge consumers and
exhibit features of what economists call two-sided markets. I conclude
not with a call to action, but with more of a checklist of which
competition law issues matter most and which represent the greatest
antitrust risks faced by the current market leader, Facebook, as social
networking continues to evolve and grow in importance.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I analyzes the difficult
questions of whether Facebook can be considered to have monopoly
power or a dominant position in one or more relevant markets for
antitrust purposes. Part II examines current Facebook business
strategies that could be deemed to violate either U.S. antitrust law or
E.U. competition law. Part III looks to the future and the most likely
areas of potential investigation and liability for Facebook or any
subsequent dominant firms in the social networking industry. Finally,
Part IV uses social networking sites as a lens to consider the broader
question of the role of antitrust in industries characterized by rapid
change and a pattern of one dominant firm being replaced by another
as technology and consumer tastes continue to evolve.
I. WHO ARE YOU CALLING A MONOPOLIST?
In order to understand the competition issues posed by social
networking, we must begin with a brief primer on the formal aspects
of U.S. antitrust law.2 Antitrust (or competition law as it is referred to
outside the United States) deals with market power, the power to
raise prices or exclude competition. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
bars contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade.3
Section 2 prohibits the unilateral misuse of market power by barring
monopolization and attempted monopolization.4 Section 7 of the
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1895018 (describing current antitrust remedies
once market power is found for information technology firms).
2. Although beyond the scope of this Article, there are over 120 jurisdictions around
the world that have their own competition systems. Most have the three main features
barring anticompetitive agreements, abuse of unilateral conduct, and anticompetitive
mergers outlined above, but with a wide variety of unique substantive, procedural, and
institutional features. For some of the diverse jurisdictions enforcing competition law
around the world, see Antitrust Sites Worldwide, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www
.justice.gov/atr/contact/otheratr.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2012).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
4. §2.
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Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the transaction
would substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.'
Numerous additional statutes and common law doctrines support and
limit this basic, but sparse, statutory framework.6 But for virtually all
of these issues, the definition of market power is key.
A. The Popular Perspective on Monopoly
This Section analyzes what competition lawyers mean when they
use the terms "monopoly" or "dominant position" and contrasts that
with the casual use of these terms in popular discourse. It is
increasingly common in the press and the blogosphere to refer to
Facebook (and other web-based platforms) as a monopoly or a
natural monopoly.7 One online article from 2010 referred to
Facebook's "Curious Social Monopoly."8 Another writer simply
stated: "[I]t's safe to say social networking is Facebook." 9
Later in 2010, Columbia Law Professor Tim Wu, now also a
consultant to the Federal Trade Commission, touched off a fierce
debate online with his essay in the Wall Street Journal describing the
Internet as "In the Grip of the New Monopolists" and discussed at
length Facebook's dominance in social networking.10 Others have
referred to Facebook as a natural monopoly derived from network
effects, but maintained by anticompetitive practices." From a more
5. §18.
6. See generally WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA H. MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST
LAW SOURCEBOOK (2011-2012 ed. 2011) (reprinting full range of antitrust-related
statutes and guidelines). The most significant for our purposes is the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which prohibits unfair methods of competition and has been interpreted
to cover both actual and incipient violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts as well as
anticompetitive conduct that violates the spirit of the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Marty Poulin, Should FTC File Facebook Antitrust?, MARTY'S MIND
(May 19, 2010), http://martysmind.com/2010/05/19/should-ftc-file-facebook-antitrust/.
8. Erika Morphy, Facebook's Curious Social Monopoly, E-CoM. TIMES (May 4,
2010,12:36 PM), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/70004.html?wlc=131 405 65 13.
9. Kevin Kelleher, How Facebook Learned from MySpace's Mistakes, CNN MONEY
(Nov. 19, 2010, 11:37 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2010/l11/19/how-facebook-learned-
from-myspaces-mistakes/.
10. Tim Wu, In the Grip of the New Monopolists, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13,2010), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704635704575604993311538482.html. But see
Matthew Ingram, Who's Afraid of Apple, Google, Facebook?, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 26, 2010, 6:11 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/technology
/content/nov20lO/tc20101126_023905.htm (arguing that Professor Wu's assessment of
Apple, Google, and Facebook as new technology monopolists was incorrect); Joshua
Wright, What's an Internet Monopolist? A Reply to Professor Wu, TECH. LIBERATION
FRONT (Nov. 23, 2010), http://techliberation.com/2010/11/23/whats-an-internet-monopolist
-a-reply-to-professor-wu/ (same).
11. rubenr, Facebook's Anti-Privacy Monopoly, DEOBFUSCATE (May 3,2010), http://
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satirical perspective, Simon Rich in the New Yorker published a
parody called "Don't Be Evil" where the Google Define result for
"Monopoly" was: "Monopoly: A term that idiots like to throw around
to sound smart at parties, but really they don't know what the hell
they're talking about.""
B. The Antitrust Perspective on Monopoly Power
From an antitrust standpoint, monopoly power is the power to
raise price or exclude competition.13 Monopoly power is not unlawful
in its own right,"n but unless a firm is deemed to have monopoly
power (or at least a dangerous probability of acquiring such power), it
cannot be held liable for monopolization or attempted
monopolization.15 Similarly, in the European Union and its member
states, a firm must be deemed to enjoy a dominant position before it
may be held liable for the abuse of that power.1 6
The presence or absence of monopoly power, or a dominant
position, is usually determined by first measuring the market share of
the firm in question in one or more relevant product and geographic
markets. 7 A relevant market for antitrust purposes normally is the
group of actual and potential producers of a product or service that
www.deobfuscate.org/?p=166; see also Leo Parker Dirac, Google+ and Facebook's Natural
Monopoly in Social Networks, EMBRACING CHAOS (July 17, 2011, 12:35 PM), http://www
.embracingchaos.com/2011/07/google-and-facebook%E2%80%99s-natural-monopoly-in-
social-networks.html ("Facebook is clearly on a path to provide a dominant monopolistic
standard for social networking data.").
12. Simon Rich, Don't Be Evil, NEW YORKER, Oct. 18,2010, at 40,40.
13. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1956). In
the European Union, the term "dominant position" is used instead of monopoly power
and is defined as the ability to hinder effective competition or act independently of
existing competition. Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R. 461,
467, 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 218-19; see also Communication from the Commission-Guidance
on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, 8
[hereinafter Enforcement Priorities] ("The assessment of whether an undertaking is in a
dominant position and of the degree of market power it holds is a first step ... ").
14. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,407
(2004).
15. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993).
16. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 102, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 89.
17. McQuillan, 506 U.S. at 459; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 2.1.3, 4 (2010) [hereinafter
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public
/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf ("Mergers that cause significant increase in concentration and
result in highly concentrated markets are presumed to be likely to enhance market
power.").
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consumers would view as a reasonably effective substitute.18 Such
power also can be shown by actual effects in the marketplace.' 9
A rough rule of thumb in the United States is that a 90% share of
a well-defined relevant market is a monopoly, 66% may be a
monopoly, and 33% clearly is not.2" In the European Union, more
than 50% of a relevant market normally is considered to be a
dominant position but some cases have found dominance with shares
as low as 40%.21
1. The Relevant Product Market
Before we define a relevant market for antitrust purposes, we
must begin with a definition of social networking itself. Only then can
we determine the outlines of the zone of effective competition: the
group of products and services that consumers view as reasonably
effective substitutes. Typically, the broader the relevant market, the
less likely the determination of market power, and vice versa. This
exercise is not an end unto itself, but merely one of the tools used to
determine whether a firm is likely to have the power to harm
competition and consumers.
There are many definitions for social networking or social
networking sites. One commonly used definition comes from a 2007
article by danah m. boyd and Nicole B. Ellison, describing social
networking sites as
[W]eb-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a
public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2)
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a
connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections
and those made by others within the system.22
Such sites typically allow users to create profiles, connect with friends,
post comments, send private messages, and form relationships with
other users of the same website who access their profile.23
Other scholars have defined social networking in similar fashion.
A 2010 article states that social networking sites are
18. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325-26 (1962); E.I. du Pont, 351
U.S. at 380-81; HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, § 4.
19. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1082-83 (D.D.C. 1997).
20. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
21. See LENNART RITTER & W. DAVID BRAUN, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 398-99 (3d ed. 2005).
22. danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210,211 (2007).
23. Id.
1776 [Vol. 90
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Web-based software application[s] that help[] users connect
and socialize with friends, family members, business partners,
or other individuals. Unlike many previous computer-mediated
communications systems such as e-mail, listserv, and online
forums, [social networking sitesi are primarily Web based and
provide a collection of means-text chats, messaging, e-mail,
video, voice, file sharing, blogging, discussion groups, etc.-for
users to interact and socialize with one another.24
Under any of these definitions, and any reasonable alternative,
Facebook is obviously a social networking site25 and the current
target of concern from a competition law perspective because of its
leading position in the industry. But it is hardly alone. In addition to
Facebook, consumers can use sites such as LinkedIn, MySpace,
Google+, Twitter, Tumblr, and a host of other sites that include most,
if not all, of the features identified in the commonly used definitions
of a social networking site.
Beyond these general social networking sites, there are an even
greater number of more specialized social networking sites. These
more specialized sites may revolve around age,26 language or national
identity, 27 an alma mater,2 a professional field, ethnicity, religion, or
other aspects of identity or affiliation.29 Other sites revolve less
24. Devi R. Gnyawali, Weiguo Fan & James Penner, Competitive Actions and
Dynamics in the Digital Age: An Empirical Investigation of Social Networking Firms, 21
INFO. SYs. RES. 594, 595-96 (2010).
25. For a detailed description of Facebook circa 2009 based on the boyd & Ellison
definition, see James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1144-49
(2009).
26. Leena Rao, Disney Acquires Social Network for Kids Togetherville,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 23, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/02/23/disney-acquires-social-
network-for-kids-togetherville/. At the opposite end of the demographic spectrum, my
daughter has described Linkedin as the "boring version of Facebook for grownups."
27. For example, Orkut is a general social networking site owned by Google that has
become the dominant social networking site in Brazil and Estonia. newbie, Orkut Who?
Ask Google, Brazil and Estonia, Apps NEWBIE (July 20,2011), http://appsnewbie.com
/apps/orkut-who-ask-google-brazil-and-estonia/. Bebo was at one time the top social
networking site in Ireland and New Zealand but was ultimately closed by its corporate
parent AOL. Suzanne Choney, AOL To Sell or Close Bebo Social Networking Site,
MSNBC.COM (Apr. 6, 2010, 6:52:05 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36197557/ns
/technology-and-science-tech-and gadgets/t/aol-sell-or-close -bebo-social-networking-
site/#.T16d8KhR8E.
28. This was the origin of Facebook, but is the focus of other current sites. See, e.g.,
SELECTMINDS, http://www.selectminds.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2012) (providing online
social networking for various educational and corporate alumni groups).
29. See, e.g., A SMALL WORLD, http://www.asmallworld.net (last visited Apr. 28,
2012) (luxury invite-only network for wealthy members); CAFE MOM, http://www.cafemom
.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2012) (mothers); DISABOOM, http://www.disaboom.com (last
visited Apr. 28, 2012) (people with disabilities); DOWNELINK, http://www.downelink.com
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around identity and more around personal interests such as music,3"
news,31 technology,32 charitable giving,33 or other diverse causes,
hobbies, and interests. Moreover, the line between identity-based and
interest-based social networking sites is a blurry one, as is the one
between specialized and general social networking sites, given the
ability of most social networking site users to customize a general site
to create different groups or lists of like-minded individuals.
Even within this extremely broad group of definitions for social
networking sites, the term is often overextended to include many
other interactive websites and software platforms where user content
is generated and shared. While reasonable people may differ, such
popular and successful sites like Groupon, Foursquare, Yelp,
Amazon, and YouTube appear to fall outside the working definition
of social networking sites, although they may be partial substitutes
and more often inputs providing information and links to the social
networking sites themselves.34 Online dating sites also bear certain
similarities to true social networking sites, but do not, from an
antitrust perspective, appear to be reasonably effective substitutes for
(last visited Apr. 28, 2012) (LGBT community); PINTEREST, http://pinterest.com (last
visited Apr. 28, 2012) (fast-growing social networking site aimed primarily at women);
RAVELRY, http://www.ravelry.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2012) (knitting). See generally
Farhad Manjoo, A Tight-Knit Community: Why Facebook Can't Match Ravelry, the Social
Network for Knitters, SLATE (July 6, 2011, 5:31 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles
/technology/technology/2011/07/atightknit community.html (social networking site for
knitters hailed by author as the best social networking site available).
30. BUZZNET, http://www.buzznet.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2012); MOG, http:/Imog
.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2012); MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Apr. 1,
2012); PING, http://www.apple.com/itunes/ping/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
31. DIGG, http://digg.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2012); REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com
(last visited Apr. 28, 2012).
32. DESIGNBUMP, http://www.designbump.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2012);
TECHNORATI, http://technorati.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2012).
33. CARE2, http://www.care2.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2012); CROWDRISE, http://www
.crowdrise.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2012); SOCIAL VIBE, http://www.socialvibe.com (last
visited Apr. 1, 2012).
34. For all aspects of the interactive web, the co-creation of value is an important
competitive strategy for this still nascent industry. See generally C.K. PRAHALAD &
VENKAT RAMASWAMY, THE FUTURE OF COMPETITION: CO-CREATING UNIQUE VALUE
WITH CUSTOMERS (2004) (discussing the co-creation of value and its importance for
internet firms); Gnyawali et al., supra note 24 (explaining how social networking service
firms can co-create value through the constantly changing online marketplace); Tim
O'Reilly, What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of
Software, 65 COMM. & STRATEGIES 17 (2007) (describing internet firms that were
successful after the dot-coin bubble burst and how they engaged in the co-creation of
value); Venkat Ramaswamy, Leading the Transformation to Co-Creation of Value, 37
STRATEGY & LEADERSHIP 32 (2009) (arguing that businesses must adopt co-creation
value models to maintain their competitiveness).
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the full range of uses and functions for most social networking site
users.
35
One of the special challenges in defining online markets
generally for antitrust purposes is determining whether online
markets are separate from brick and mortar competition. While this is
a difficult issue in general, it seems less so for social networking sites
in particular and especially for Facebook or any future market leader.
As one commentator has noted:
[Slocial networking sites do not have readily identifiable
substitutes that exist in brick-and-mortar businesses. In fact,
social networking Web sites are a relatively new concept and
represent a new product that does not exist in brick-and-mortar
form.36
There is a strong case to be made that the relevant product
market is the social networking itself. Here, the online experience is
so qualitatively different from the real world forms of networking and
social intercourse that offline networking may be no longer a
meaningful substitute for some social networking sites and other
forms of interactive internet use.37
Finally, it is important to remember that market definition is not
an all-or-nothing exercise. The enforcement agencies and the courts
examine multiple relevant markets in the same case or investigation,
often from multiple perspectives, such as consumers, competitors, or
suppliers to determine the basic question of market power.
2. The Geographic Market
The next piece of the puzzle is the geographic scope of the
relevant market. Again, the question is what geographic options
consumers regard as reasonably effective substitutes such that any
attempt to exercise market power would likely be ineffective.38 While
this determination can be complicated for many goods and services in
the physical world, it is somewhat easier for software and internet
products. While real world businesses must contend with
35. LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV06-6994 ARM (RZx), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43739, at *18-19 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007), affd, 304 F. App'x 554 (9th Cir. 2008).
36. Jared Kagan, Bricks, Mortar, and Google: Defining the Relevant Antitrust Market
for Internet-Based Companies, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 271,290 (2010-2011).
37. For purposes of this Article, I am using social networking as a distinct subset of
what is frequently referred to as Web 2.0. See generally O'Reilly, supra note 34 (defining
Web 2.0 as the set of new web-based applications and programs that emerged after the
dot-com bubble burst).
38. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, § 4.2.
2012] 1779
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transportation costs, spoilage, and other issues that may limit the
scope of the geographic market, this is not the case for internet
access, which is cheap and not limited by distance. The only case to
wrestle with this issue for social networking spent little time on this
issue and accepted the plaintiff's allegation of a relevant market
consisting of "Internet-based social networking in the geographic
region of the United States."39
Given the nature of the Internet itself, there is a possibility that
the market could be global in nature, as has been the case in several
prior non-Internet cases involving computer software and hardware.4 °
However, the ability of foreign governments to disable or hamper
internet access,41 language barriers, and the overall goals of the
antitrust laws to foster competition within the United States, all
suggest that a national market definition may be the most appropriate
market definition.
3. Measuring Facebook's Market Share
Even if we limit the relevant market to online social
networking sites in the United States, calculating actual market shares
is complicated. This Article has yet to focus on the exact social
networking market to be measured. At least three reasonable
alternatives have been suggested.
a. User Markets
The first is simply users. User markets may be the easiest to
measure, but it is far from clear that an antitrust lawyer, enforcer, or
court would conclude that this is the relevant market. Even if we limit
39. LiveUniverse, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43739, at *10.
40. In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litig., No. 05-1717-JJF, 2007 WL
137152, at *9 (D. Del. Jan. 12, 2007); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098,
1161-66 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Commercial Data Servers, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 166 F.
Supp. 2d 891, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
41. Abdullah Al-Shihri, Associated Press, Saudi Arabia Blocks Facebook over Moral
Concerns, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2010, 10:39 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2010/11/13/saudi-arabia-blocks-faceb_n_783116.html; Facebook To Be Blocked in
Pakistan, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Sept. 20,2011, 16:04 IST), http://www.hindustantimes.com
/Block-access-to-Facebook-Pak-court/Articlel-747919.aspx; Thousands Expected To Take
to the Streets in Biggest Egypt Protest So Far, as Authorities Block Twitter and Facebook,
DAILY MAIL (Jan. 28, 2011, 2:21 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1351070
/Egypt-protests-Twitter-Facebook-blocked-Government.html; Robin Wauters, China
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ourselves to viewers of the social networking websites, further
precision is needed.
One way to measure total users is simply by measuring total page
views. Another is registered users who presumably represent a higher
level of commitment. For most social networking sites, these often
merge because registration is required to view full user content
(subject to the other user's privacy settings). Measured either way,
Facebook is on the cusp of market power, the first of the two steps in
most antitrust analyses.
A November 2011 survey showed Facebook's "market share" at
just over 63%, followed by YouTube at just under 20%, Twitter in
third with a little over 1%, and a large number of firms clustered at or
below 1%.42 This particular survey of web traffic included a number
of firms that are at most only partially social networking sites and
thus understates Facebook's market share.
These types of marginally useful market share data are also quite
volatile over time. A May 2011 report showed Facebook's market
share dropping by over 5% in the United States.43 It was only May
2009 when MySpace and Facebook had roughly identical shares of
approximately 30% each, whereas at present MySpace draws less
than 1% of the total page views." The history of social networking is
replete with dominant firms that have crashed and burned to become
also-rans or simply exited the market.45 These include Friendster,
MySpace, and could yet include Facebook.
b. Advertising Markets
A second way to look at Facebook's market share is to examine
its share of advertising revenues.46 Here, the quantity and
demographics of viewers is merely secondary, or an input, for the
online display ads that can be sold to advertisers seeking to reach this
audience. An April 2011 web post estimated Facebook's share of such
42. Priit Kallas, Top 10 Social Networking Sites by Market Share of Visits [December
2011], DREAMGROW (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.dreamgrow.com/top-10-social-
networking-sites-market-share-of-visits-december-2011/.
43. eyre, Facebook Losing Ground in US, BROTHERSOFT (June 14, 2011), http://news
.brothersoft.com/facebook-losing-ground-in-us-13536.html.
44. Kallas, supra note 42.
45. There is a similar history for other internet-related services. For historical data on
market share volatility in internet backbone traffic, web browser, internet search, and
internet portals, see ELI M. NOAM, MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND CONCENTRATION IN
AMERICA 273 (2009).
46. Kelleher, supra note 9.
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display advertising at just over 30%.47 The data for the first quarter of
2011 is in a similar range.48 While impressive, this type of market
share simply is not enough to satisfy the market power requirement
for antitrust liability for monopolization or attempted monopolization
in the United States or abuse of a dominant position in the European
Union or most other jurisdictions applying a similar standard.49
It is an open question whether online advertising is even a
separate relevant market from its offline alternatives. While online
advertising of both the search and display variety is a rapidly growing
market, both pale at present in comparison to the total amount of
newspaper, magazine, radio, television, billboard, and other forms of
traditional advertising.50
However, the trend in the business world is to view these
different channels as part of what is referred to as integrated
marketing. In such an approach, the advertisers use multiple
advertising channels, public relations, promotions, and sponsorship
tools to reach deeply fragmented audiences with different
demographics multiple times for any campaign.5' For example, Jenn-
Air, a manufacturer of high-end cooking appliances, is using a broad
array of magazine ads, online advertising, public relations, social
media, apps for Apple phones and tablets, and experiential marketing
to reach out to different parts of its targeted demographics in an
integrated marketing campaign.52
47. Ken Burbary, Facebook's Market Share of Display Advertising [Statistics], KEN
BURBARY'S LIFESTREAM (Apr. 4, 2011), http://kenburbary.posterous.com/facebooks-
market-share-of-display-advertising.
48. U.S. Online Display Advertising Market Delivers 1.1 Trillion Impressions in Q1
2011, PR NEWSWIRE (May 4, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/us-online-
display-advertising-market-delivers-11-trillion-impressions-in-ql-2011-121249734.html.
49. AD/SAT, Div. of Skylight, Inc. v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 229 (2d Cir.
1999) ("[W]e have held that a 33 percent market share does not approach the level
required for a showing of dangerous probability of monopoly power."); Case T-219/99,
British Airways plc v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-5917, IT 211, 223-25, 4 C.M.L.R. 19,
IT 211, 223-25 (finding dominant position with market share just under 40% where
market shares of rivals were much smaller and fragmented).
50. KEN AULETrA, GOOGLED: THE END OF THE WORLD As WE KNOW IT 16 (2009)
(estimating that online advertising would constitute 13% of the total advertising market by
2011).
51. Id. at 237; Ilchul Kim, Dongsub Han & Don E. Schultz, Understanding the
Diffusion of Integrated Marketing Communications, 44 J. ADVERTISING RES. 31, 32-33
(2004); Tim Peterson, Mastering the Mix, DIRECT MARKETING NEWS, Oct. 1, 2011, at 34,
35-38. See generally M. JOSEPH SIRGY & DON R. RAHTZ, STRATEGIC MARKETING
COMMUNICATIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO IMC (2006) (discussing different channels
used for effective integrated marketing).
52. Stuart Elliott, Jenn-Air in Ad Deal with Architectural Digest, N.Y. TIMES MEDIA
DECODER BLOG (Mar. 18, 2011, 3:43 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011
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The limited number of relevant antitrust cases, settlements, and
investigations have tread carefully in this evolving area of the
advertising industry. The European Commission accepted online
search advertising as a separate relevant market in its Google/Double
Click decision. 3 The Federal Trade Commission seems to assume
that online search advertising is a relevant market in the handful of its
merger decisions between online advertising firms, but does not
analyze, let alone decide, this issue in its public statements in these
cases.
54
Obviously, there is some substitution between online and offline
advertising, 55 but the changing nature of the advertising industry
means that the degree of substitution may not fully answer the
question of what constitutes a relevant market for antitrust
purposes.56 As a result, an online advertising market may be both
overinclusive and underinclusive.57 However, to the extent that the
relevant market for online display advertising currently includes
search advertising (dominated by Google) or more traditional offline
print and media advertising, Facebook's share of any larger market
shrinks dramatically and its likely antitrust concerns recede even
further. 8
/03/18/jenn-air-in-ad-deal-with-architectural-digest/; see also Renee Cook, Bringing It All
Together: Four Examples of Integrated Marketing Campaigns, SUNDOG (Aug. 26, 2010),
http://www.sundoginteractive.com/sunblog/posts/bringing-it-all-together-four-examples-
of-integrated-marketing-campaigns (discussing additional examples of integrated
marketing campaigns from Kraft Foods, Popeyes, Dickies, and Wheat Thins).
53. Press Release, European Comm'n, Mergers: Commission Clears Proposed
Acquisition of DoubleClick by Google (Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid
/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/426.
54. FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC No. 101-0031, STATEMENT OF FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION CONCERNING GOOGLE/ADMOB 2 (2010) [hereinafter FTC,
GOOGLE/ADMOB], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/100521google-admobstmt
.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC No. 071-0170, STATEMENT OF FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION CONCERNING GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK 8 (2007) [hereinafter FTC,
GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170
/071220statement.pdf.
55. Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Substitution Between Offline and Online
Advertising Markets, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 37, 40-43 (2011).
56. James D. Ratliff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Online Advertising: Defining Relevant
Markets, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 653,672-76 (2010).
57. Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The
Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 171, 194-203 (2011).
58. Other potentially relevant antitrust markets for further inquiry include a market
for social networking technology or a market for online payment systems. In both cases,
Facebook's large presence simply is not yet a large enough share to warrant an inference
of monopoly power. See, e.g., Caroline McCarthy, Facebook to Developers: Get Ready for
Credits, CNET NEWS (Feb. 25, 2010, 5:26 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-
10460201-36.html; Caroline McCarthy, Patent Filings Reveal Facebook Shopping Spree,
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c. Data Markets
A third way of looking at the question of market share for social
networking sites suggests that Facebook and other social networking
sites compete in a market for information about users. This market
consists of both the aggregate and individual information that users
post to their social networking sites or reveal through their
communications with others on the network, whether other users,
advertisers, or application developers.
It is possible that social networking sites will compete over the
protection of personal information and compete to offer the most
complete form of privacy to its users.59 While this can be a useful
metric for certain antitrust purposes,6' the more likely scenario is that
most social networking sites compete in the opposite direction as to
the acquisition, compilation, manipulation, exposure, and
monetization (rather than the protection) of personal information in
aggregate and individual forms (and intermediate level compilations
where mandated by law).
Monetization comes in the form of advertising, revenues from
application developers, and the ability to raise money in capital
markets. Thus, a strong argument can be made that the zone of
effective competition is the one in which firms monetize their
operations.61 As one recent commentator has noted: "[T]he true
CNET NEWS (Aug. 5, 2010, 6:13 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-20012747-
36.html; Laurie Segall, Facebook's $600 Million Virtual Economy, CNN MONEY (Apr. 28,
2011, 5:12 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/28/technology/facebookcredits/index.htm.
59. Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An
Expanded Vision of Relevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 792-94 (2010)
(discussing the notion of privacy as an aspect of non-price competition).
60. A merger that injures privacy protection as an element of non-price competition
would be one example. Id.
61. Somini Sengupta & Evelyn M. Rusli, Personal Data's Value? Facebook Set To
Find Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at Al (discussing Facebook's impending initial public
offering); J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Intel, Apple, Google and
Facebook: Observations on Antitrust and the High-Tech Sector, Remarks Before the
ABA Antitrust Section Fall Forum 18 (Nov. 18,2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov
/speeches/rosch/101118fallforum.pdf. This does not mean that privacy is irrelevant from an
antitrust perspective. For example, privacy requirements may constitute an important
barrier to entry and/or switching cost within a different relevant market. Randal C. Picker,
Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 10-
11 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/25/ (discussing the
privacy implications of portability); cf. Steve Lohr, You Want My Personal Data? Reward
Me for It, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2010, at BU3 (discussing Bynamite website where users sell
right to track all online activity).
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product Facebook brings to the 'market' is not its technology, but the
social information about, and access to, its vast user base.
62
Unfortunately, the usual antitrust tools are not very useful for
resolving this issue. Normally, courts and enforcers begin their
market definition inquiry by asking whether consumers would switch
to another product or supplier in the event of a small but significant
and non-transitory price ("SSNP") increase.6 3 If a significant number
of consumers would switch to another supplier, then that supplier
should be included in the relevant market. The analysis then
continues until one has exhausted the number of reasonably effective
substitutes to be included in the relevant market. 64
In plain English, if Facebook raised its prices 5% to 10% over
the long-term, would a significant number of consumers switch to
other social networking sites or other forms of online interaction? If
so, then those alternatives (presumably the other leading social
networking sites) should be included in the relevant market. If not,
then Facebook stands alone as the relevant market with a strong
presumption of market power.
While this type of SSNP test might be undertaken in markets for
advertisers and application developers, it is less helpful from the user
perspective. Facebook, and most other social networking sites, are
free to users. 5 The furor over alleged plans or even mere rumors that
Facebook would begin to charge users at some point in the future 66
62. Chris Butts, The Microsoft Case 10 Years Later: Antitrust and New Leading "New
Economy" Firms, 8 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275, 290 (2010); see also AULETTA,
supra note 50, at 138-39 (discussing how Google's power stems from data it gathers);
O'Reilly, supra note 34, at 27 (arguing that data is the core competency of web 2.0
companies).
63. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, § 4.12.
64. Id.
65. They are not free to advertisers and application developers and are thus examples
of two-sided markets where the revenues come from one side of the market but require
analysis of both sides of the market in order to fully analyze welfare effects. See generally
DAVID S. EVANS, ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF Two-SIDED MARKETS: ECONOMICS,
ANTITRUST, & INDUSTRY STUDIES (2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc
/50890892/Essays-on-the-Economics-of-Two-Sided-Markets-Economics-Antitrust-and-
Strategy (exploring full range of economic issues raised by two-sided markets); David S.
Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Free, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Spring 2011, at 771
(examining the role of free products in two-sided markets and their effect on defining the
relevant product market). In addition, at least some social networking sites like Linkedin
offer paid subscription accounts that focus on the job search. See Linkedin Launches Two
New Subscription Offerings, LINKEDIN (Nov. 22,2005), http://press.linkedin.com/77
/linkedin-launches-two-new-subscription-offerings.
66. See Nick Clayton, Facebook Changes Give New Life to Old Rumors, WALL ST. J.
TECH BLOG (Sept. 26, 2011, 7:14 AM), http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/2011/09/26
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points in both directions. The various campaigns to boycott Facebook
or deactivate accounts 67 suggest that (to borrow a phrase from
Google) competition is just a click away. On the other hand, the fact
that most people never followed through on such plans suggests that
either the threat to charge was not a credible one (in which case the
relevant market is quite broad) or that users are loyal or feel bound
to Facebook (in which case the relevant market is quite narrow).
4. Barriers to Entry and Exit
Measuring the market share Facebook enjoys within some
relevant market or markets is not the end of the exercise. The
existence or absence of entry barriers provides further information
regarding whether the market shares are an accurate indication of
true market power.' If entry barriers are low, then even quite high
market shares may not indicate an ability to raise prices going
forward. Conversely, high entry barriers confirm that the market
shares are a meaningful indication of power and may even understate
the ability of the firm in question to harm competition and
consumers. 
69
Like everything else in the social networking space, the question
of entry barriers is a complicated one. The technology necessary to
create a social networking site appears to be widely available. Capital
costs similarly appear minimal. The numerous existing and newly
appearing social networking sites all suggest that traditional entry
barriers appear minimal. However, the mere ability to create a
functioning social networking site significantly understates two more
meaningful entry barriers that reinforce the market power of any
existing dominant firm: network effects and stickiness.
/facebook-changes-give-new-life-to-old-rumors/tab/; Manami Mallick, Facebook Trashes
'Charging' Hoax: Will It Remain Free Always?, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2011, 3:10
AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/220387/20110927/facebook-charges-users-hoax-free-
always-rumor-web-10-attention-message-timeline-ticker-profile-messa.htm.
67. See, e.g., Jennifer Van Grove, Facebook Exodus Planned for May 31: Will You
Quit?, MASHABLE (May 14, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/05/14/quit-facebook/
(describing planned boycott on privacy grounds).
68. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, § 9.
69. The enforcement agencies and the courts also will consider any other evidence
that suggests that the market share in a well-defined market overstates or understates the
defendant's market power. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,
503-04 (1974).
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a. Network Effects
The first is the concept of network effects. Network effects refer
to the well-known phenomenon that systems may quickly increase in
value as the number of users grow, and similarly, that the network
may have little, or no, value without large scale adoption. 7' Network
effects can be either direct or indirect. Direct network effects refer to
systems like communications networks whose value directly increases
as the number of users increase.7 Traditional examples include
telephones and fax machines where the systems are of limited value
until the number of users achieves a certain threshold. Indirect
network effects refer to systems where the development of
complements increases the value of the system to users.7 1 Well-known
examples include hardware-software combinations like computers
and applications, DVD players and discs, and game consoles and
games. Either type of network effect can create significant entry
barriers, although some commentators have argued that indirect
network effects are not normally exclusionary because the costs are
fully internalized by the parties in the network.7'
These notions have been debated in antitrust circles for more
than a decade.74 Much of the finding of market power in recent
litigation involving Microsoft turned on a form of indirect network
effects. The so-called application barrier to entry described the
situation where entry into the operating system market was
effectively blocked by the inability of new entrants (or existing fringe
firms) to secure commitments from software application developers
to write programs for the new or competing operating system. This
phenomenon deterred effective new entry or expansion by fringe
70. CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE
TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 13 (1999); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems
Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 109,
71. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 70, at 95-96.
72. Id. at 96-98.
73. Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Effects and the Microsoft Case,
in DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY: TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION AND
ANTITRUST ISSUES 160, 161-62, 164-65,190-92 (Jerry Ellig ed., 2001).
74. See, e.g., William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A Contrarian View, 7 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 577, 579-94 (1999); Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 500-23 (1998); Gregory J. Werden,
Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST
L.J. 87, 100-02 (2001); Max Schanzenbach, Network Effects and Antitrust Law: Predation,
Affirmative Defenses, and the Case of U.S. v. Microsoft, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4,
11l 6-74, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/schanzenbach-network-effects.pdf.
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competitors and bolstered Microsoft's power as the dominant
provider of computer operating systems.75
For social networking sites, it is important to quickly achieve,
and then maintain, a critical mass of users, advertisers, and
application developers. 76 Research has shown that the ability to
achieve critical mass is far more important than the so-called first
mover advantage.7 7 Moreover, few network effects exist until that
critical mass is achieved and, until then, create little value to the
network.78
Facebook benefits from a host of both direct and indirect
network effects. The sheer number of users in the system is the most
obvious such effect and makes its network immensely more valuable
than any of its competitors. As of the end of 2011, Facebook had
approximately 900 million users.79 In contrast, Google's fast-growing
Google+ social networking site had approximately 25 million users as
of September 2011.80 The network effects that Facebook enjoys go
beyond the traditional networking aspects of Facebook and
encompass video, email, messaging, and other features, which are
increasingly important aspects of the network.8 The number of users
and the array of fine-grained information that users have posted are
on a scale vastly superior to its competitors and are an important
source of direct and indirect network effects for users, advertisers,
application developers, and other service providers.
75. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
76. Bin Wang, Survival and Competition Among Social Networking Websites: A
Research Commentary on "Critical Mass and Willingness To Pay for Social Networks" by
J. Christopher Westland, 9 ELECTRONIC COM. RES. & APPLICATIONS 20, 20 (2010); J.
Christopher Westland, Critical Mass and Willingness To Pay for Social Networks, 9
ELECTRONIC COM. RES. & APPLICATIONS 6, 18 (2010).
77. Westland, supra note 76, at 16-18.
78. Id.
79. Fact Sheet, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx
?NewsArealD=22 (last visited Apr. 30, 2012).
80. Google+ Opens Social Network to Everyone, BBC (Sept. 20, 2011, 17:02), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-14985494.
81. See, e.g., Byron Acohido, Latest Facebook Changes Touch Privacy Nerve, ABC
NEWS (Oct. 1, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/latest-facebook-touch-privacy-
nerve/story?id=14647661 (discussing new features allowing sharing of user's web surfing
patterns and other information); Todd Haselton, Privacy Groups Ask FTC To Probe
Facebook, Fox BUS. (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2011/10/03





The durability of these network effects is reinforced by the
stickiness of the system. It is well documented how difficult it is to
terminate a Facebook account.82 Numerous people are required to
maintain an account in order to post or receive information for a
company, cause, or other group page. Facebook also has become de
facto mandatory for millions of other users for purely social reasons.
While temporary deactivation is not particularly difficult, it can
be psychologically and socially difficult, with friends, colleagues, and
family members being unable to reach you through the system and
inquiring offline if everything is all right. Moving from temporary to
permanent deactivation is even more difficult. Facebook requires a
two-week period before taking down a page.83 Failure to deactivate
certain links to Facebook or inadvertently hitting the "Like" or
"Share" on other websites will nullify the deactivation and require
beginning again.' Even after final deactivation, Facebook maintains
ownership of the information and images posted by the user. 5
Facebook is sticky in another way that increases switching costs
for users. While numerous other social networking sites exist if a user
is so inclined, exporting information from Facebook to these sites is
not simple. Since 2006, Facebook has offered users something called
Facebook Connect, which allows users to share their information with
the third-party websites and applications they choose.86 While
couched in terms of allowing the user to take his data with him across
the web, it appears to be focused on connecting the information on
the user's other web-based accounts back to his Facebook account
(importation not exportation) and allowing advertisers and
application developers access to a broader array of user data.87
82. See, e.g., Kristi Oloffson, Why Is It So Hard To Delete Your Facebook Account?,
TIME (May 14, 2010), http://newsfeed.time.com/2010/05/14/why-is-it-so-hard-to-delete-
your-facebook-account/. For discussion of how the effect of a user's death on one's
Facebook page is fraught with difficulty, see generally Jason Mazzone, Facebook's
Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1643 (2012).
83. Help Center: Deactivating, Deleting, and Memorializing Accounts, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=185698814812082 (last visited Apr. 30, 2012)
[hereinafter Help Center]; How To Permanently Delete a Facebook Account, WIKIHOW,
http://www.wikihow.comlPermanently-Delete-a-Facebook-Account (last updated Apr. 4,
2012).
84. How to Permanently Delete a Facebook Account, supra note 83.
85. Help Center, supra note 83.
86. Dave Morrin, Announcing Facebook Connect, FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS (May 9,
2008, 12:32 PM), http://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/108/.
87. Id. ("Today we are announcing Facebook Connect. Facebook Connect is the next
iteration of Facebook Platform that allows users to "connect" their Facebook identity,
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Since 2010, Facebook has permitted users to download all profile
information onto a zip file and then upload that information to a new
website 8" Facebook has improved this feature in several ways,89
partially as a result of competition from Google over control and
exportability of user information.9" It is not clear, though, how many
of Facebook's more casual users know about this feature or can
successfully utilize it. In addition, Facebook does not allow third-
party sites (including rival social networking sites) to directly acquire
a user's information. The alternative is the cumbersome reposting of
profile information, wall posts, photos, videos, and other information
on the new site, which is time-consuming, subject to errors,
impossible in some cases, and likely to cause many users to simply
live with their existing Facebook page.
friends and privacy to any site. This will now enable third party websites to implement and
offer even more features of Facebook Platform off of Facebook - similar to features
available to third party applications today on Facebook.").
88. Help Center: Download Your Information, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com
/help/?page=116481065103985 (last visited Apr. 30, 2012); see also Alexia Tsotsis,
Facebook Now Allows You To "Download Your Information," TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 6,
2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/10/06/facebook-now-allows-you-to-download-your-
information/ (explaining how Facebook allows users to download their data onto zip files).
89. Emil Protalinski, Facebook Finally Makes Your Exported Data Useful, ZDNET
(Sept. 8, 2011, 3:48 PM), http://www.zdnet.comlblog/facebook/facebook-finally-makes-
your-exported-data-useful/3452.
90. Google has created a project called the Data Liberation Front that seeks to make
data portability easier for the growing number of Google applications, including its social
networking site Google+. See generally DATA LIBERATION, http://www.dataliberation
.org/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2012) (describing Google's data liberation project). The new
program called Google Takeout helps users export various types of data from Google
programs such as Circles, Picassa, Google+, Contacts, and Google Profile and easily
bundle the data into a zip file for downloading and exporting to other websites or
programs. Many commentators regard Google Takeout as a key difference between the
two social networking sites and the more effective tool against data lock-in. See Clint
Boulton, Google Data Liberation Front Unlocks Data Facebook Hoards, EWEEK.COM
(July 18, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Messaging-and-Collaboration/Google-Data-
Liberation-Front-Unlocks-Data-Facebook-Hoards-750192; Rory MacDonald, Google+:
Extract Your Contacts from Facebook Using Open-Xchange, LINUX USER & DEVELOPER,
http://www.linuxuser.co.uk/news/google-extract-your-contacts-from-facebook-using-open-
xchange/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2012); Declan McCullagh, Google Wields Data Openness
Against Facebook, CNET NEWS (July 15, 2011, 2:16 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
31921_3-20079907-281google-wields-data-openness-against-facebook/; Anna Sanina,
Google's Data Liberation Front Presents Takeout, POPSOP (July 4, 2011), http://popsop
.com/47302. For a demonstration of how to use this new feature and its relative ease, see
Paul Spoerry, How To: Download Your Google+ Data, PLUSHEADLINES.COM (Aug. 8,
2011), http://plusheadlines.com/how-to-download-your-google-data/909/.
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C. Market Power via Lock-in
As a result of the network and stickiness effects described above,
there is a serious possibility that Facebook already has market power
over current users who are, or feel, locked-in to the system. Even if
Facebook lacks market power in a broader market for social
networking sites, it may have market power over an installed base of
users. Familiar examples include purchasers of expensive durable
hardware, loyal shoppers of well-established brands, and other
examples of differentiated products, where the potential substitutes
seemingly available through standard market definition are in fact
very poor substitutes and permit the firm to exploit their locked-in
user base at the back end, rather than the front end, of the
relationship."
Information gaps, switching costs, and brand loyalty may prevent
a customer from accurately pricing a product or service over its
lifetime. Even if such behavior were possible, the producer may still
be in a position to act opportunistically and change the terms of the
bargain after the customer base has been established and locked in
place. For example, the Supreme Court denied summary judgment in
an antitrust case to a manufacturer of photocopier equipment with a
very modest share of the copier market, which nonetheless was able
to change its parts and service policy to the detriment of long-term
users, thus creating triable issues of tying and monopolization with
respect to customers and competitors.92 More broadly, other forms of
deception such as false advertising, disparagement of competing
products, fictitious product and feature announcements (so-called
vaporware), and manipulation of standard setting processes may
support liability for a dominant firm as well.93
This scenario has already played out in a number of variations
involving Facebook. While there is no issue of lock-in via purchase of
expensive capital goods or contractual restrictions, many Facebook
users feel locked-in and subject to unwanted important policy and
91. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, § 3; Deven R. Desai &
Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1425, 1482-84.
92. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 477-78 (1992).
At trial on remand, the jury found for the plaintiff and the verdict was affirmed on appeal.
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1228 (9th Cir. 1997).
93. Maurice E. Stucke, How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a
Dominant Firm's Deception, 63 SMU L. REV. 1069, 1083-1113 (2010); Maurice E. Stucke,
When a Monopolist Deceives, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 823, 824-26 (2010).
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operating changes.94 There have been numerous instances of changes
to Facebook's privacy policies that have provoked outrage and even
the occasional user defection, 95 but no real impact on Facebook's
growth.
While there are realistic theories under which Facebook already
has market power, it is not inevitable that an enforcement agency or
court would agree. The notion that customer lock-in can confer
market power in the traditional antitrust sense is contested. 96 Even if
the theory is accepted in this new context, much will depend on the
facts as they evolve on the ground in this fast-changing industry.
Moreover, market power is merely the beginning, rather than the
end, of the inquiry.
II. WHAT, IF ANYTHING, DOES FACEBOOK Do WRONG?
Even if we surmount all the heavy lifting of concluding that
Facebook has meaningful market power in some relevant antitrust
market, we have completed only the first step of the inquiry. It still
remains to determine whether Facebook (or any other dominant
social networking site in the future) has engaged in conduct that
constitutes a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act or its foreign
analogues.
A section 2 violation requires the acquisition or maintenance of
monopoly power (or the abuse of a dominant position under E.U.
law) through conduct that excludes competition on some basis other
than competition on the merits. 97 While this is an exceptionally broad
and somewhat circular definition, it has come to mean that even a
monopolist may engage in conduct that harms its competitors, if it has
a valid business justification for doing so. A valid business
justification is one that makes sense for the firm and its customers and
does not depend principally on the long-term effects of destroying its
remaining competitors or deterring new entry. 98
The existing antitrust case law in the United States and the
European Union provides only the beginning of a roadmap for the
94. Alex Ogle, Profound Change for Facebook Set To 'Lock In' Users,
PHYSORG.COM (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-09-profound-
facebook-users.html.
95. Helen A.S. Popkin, Facebook To Share Your Phone Number, Address,
MSNBC.COM TECHNOLOG, http://technolog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/03/01/6162397-
facebook-to-share-your-phone-number-address (last visited Apr. 30, 2012).
96. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 496-500 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
98. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,608-10 (1985).
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social networking space. Recent antitrust cases address computer
hardware and software issues only tangentially related to those most
relevant for interactive social networking internet sites. 9
There are also a growing number of investigations and a handful
of consent decrees requiring structural and behavioral changes to
mergers between internet companies. Examples include mergers and
joint ventures reviewed by the FTC, the Department of Justice, and
the European Union involving a number of acquisitions by Google,1°°
Microsoft, 1 ' and other firms. All of these decisions are helpful in
better understanding antitrust agency thinking on the question of
online markets and entry barriers, but none directly deal with social
networking sites or with issues of monopolization."°
The current round of government investigations of Google in the
United States and the European Union may shed further light, but
similarly are focused elsewhere. These investigations are focused on
allegations that Google has manipulated internet search results to the
detriment of competitors or otherwise limited the ability of
99. Of course, social networking can be used as a communication medium for
competitors to collude or exchange sensitive information that could be a traditional
Sherman Act section 1 violation, but the same is true in any online or offline interaction
between competitors. Jeffrey S. Tenenbaum, A.J. Zottola & Jennifer Mallon, The Legal
Aspects of Online Social Networks: An Overview for Associations, VENABLE LLP (Oct. 12,
2009), http://www.venable.com/the-legal-aspects-of-online-social-networks-an-overview-
for-associations-10-12-2009/; see also United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01629-
RBW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83756, at *4-10 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011) (entering a consent
decree barring Silicon Valley firms from agreeing not to poach rivals' employees).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Google Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00688 (RLW), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 124151, at "1, *21-28 (D.D.C. July 7, 2011); FTC, GOOGLE/ADMOI3, supra note
54, at 1; FTC, GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK, supra note 54, at 1; Press Release, European
Comm'n, supra note 53. In addition, a planned joint venture between Google and Yahoo
was abandoned because of antitrust concerns. Jessica E. Vascellaro & Nick Wingfield,
Google Ditches Ad Pact with Yahoo, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2008, at B1.
101. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division on Its Decision To Close Its Investigation of the Internet Search and
Paid Search Advertising Agreement Between Microsoft Corporation and Yahoo! Inc.
(Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2010255377
.pdf.
102. Similarly, antitrust issues were only peripheral in the litigation over the Google
book project and the 2010 rejection of the proposed settlement of the class action suit in
that matter. See Matthew Sag, The Google Book Settlement and the Fair Use
Counterfactual, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19, 72 (2010); Randal C. Picker, Assessing
Competition Issues in the Amended Google Book Search Settlement 11-12 (Univ. of Chi.
Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 499, 2009), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1507172.
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developers to create applications.1"3 A limited number of private
cases dealing with these search-related issues also exist, but none
have given us a definitive ruling on liability issues or a roadmap of
how these issues would play out for social networking sites. "
Core issues of monopolization for social networking sites are just
beginning to come to the fore. The only known government
investigation is the FTC's investigation of Twitter's alleged
restrictions on companies that develop applications using Twitter data
for their own use.0 5
On the private side, the decisions do not reveal much either. In
2008, an unpublished order from the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of a case against MySpace alleging that it denied access to a
rival website. °6 In 2009, a California federal district court dismissed a
claim against Facebook alleging that Facebook had blocked a smaller
rival from obtaining information from the Facebook site for its own
use. 107 Most recently, an Ohio state court dismissed for lack of
antitrust injury allegations a claim that Google disfavored a rival
search firm in search and advertising placement. 18
Beyond the reported cases and current investigations, the
antitrust concerns and potential causes of action become even fuzzier.
103. Steve Lohr, Suit Opens a Window into Google, N.Y. TIMEs, May 9, 2011, at B1;
Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Probes Allegations of Antitrust
Violations by Google (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid
/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1624; Foo Yun Chee, Exclusive: Nine Google
Complainants in EU Probe, REUTERS (Aug. 2,2011, 1:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com
/article/2011/08/02/us-eu-google-idUSTRE77131120110802; Cade Metz, Google Faces
Antitrust Investigation in Texas, REGISTER (Sept. 3, 2010, 23:18 GMT), http://www
.theregister.co.uk/2010/09/03/googleantitrust investigation injtexas/; David Meyer, EU
Highlights Difficulty of Establishing Online Antitrust, ZDNET (July 8, 2010, 17:14), http://
www.zdnet.co.uk/news/regulation/2010/07/08/eu-highlights-difficulty-of-establishing-
online-antitrust-40089482/.
104. See, e.g., TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370, 381
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing claim due to enforceable forum selection clause that required
litigation of the antitrust claims in California), aff'd, 647 F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 2011); see also
Person v. Google, Inc., No. C06-7297JF(RS), 2007 WL 1831111, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 25,
2007) (dismissing second amended pro se complaint alleging that Google has monopolized
the "search advertising market").
105. Amir Efrati, Antitrust Regulator Makes Twitter Inquiries, WALL ST. J., July 1,
2011, at B3.
106. LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, 304 F. App'x 554, 556-58 (9th Cir. 2008)
(affirming the district court's 12(b)(6) dismissal of an antitrust "refusal to deal" claim in
light of Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004)).
107. See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C08-5780JF(RS), 2009 WL
3429568, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2009).
108. Google, Inc. v. myTriggers.com, Inc., No. 09CVH10-14836, slip op. at 8-10 (Ohio
Ct. Com. P1. Aug. 31, 2011), available at 2011 WL 3850286.
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At least one consumer group has filed complaints with the FTC
alleging that Facebook has entered into exclusionary contracts with
game developers. 1°9 Facebook and Google have traded allegations
relating to the ability to obtain (or block) information from each
other's site, a practice called "scraping."' 0 It was also revealed that
Facebook created a clumsy public relations campaign to plant
unfavorable stories about Google in the mainstream and online
media."' However, none of these examples and allegations provide a
clear indication of what constitutes present unlawful exclusionary
conduct by Facebook.
III. ANTITRUST ISSUES GOING FORWARD
Given the uncertainties about market power and the lack of a
clear roadmap as to unlawful behavior, the issue remains as to what, if
anything, to be concerned about going forward. Here, the answer may
differ markedly depending on whether we are discussing
monopolization or attempted monopolization in the United States or
the abuse of dominance in the European Union.
One key difference between section 2 of the Sherman Act and
article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
and its analogues in many jurisdictions is the concept of attempted
monopolization. Section 2 of the Sherman Act reaches attempted
monopolization as well as exclusionary behavior by existing
monopolists.112 Attempted monopolization requires proof of a
specific intent to monopolize, exclusionary behavior, and a dangerous
probability of success.113
109. John M. Simpson, Carmen Balber & Jamie Court, Consumer Watchdog Says
Facebook Credits Used in Online Games Violate Antitrust Law; Asks Federal Trade
Commission To Intervene, CONSUMER WATCHDOG (June 29, 2011), http://www
.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/consumer-watchdog-says-facebook-credits-used-
online-games-violate-antitrust-law-asks-fed.
110. Alexi Oreskovic, Google Bars Data from Facebook as Rivalry Heats Up,
REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2010, 7:06 PM), http:lwww.reuters.comlarticle12010/11/05/us-google-
facebook-idUSTRE6A455420101105; see also David Gelles, Facebook Accused of
Restricting Its Users, FIN. TIMES (July 11, 2009, 1:01 AM), http://www.ft.com/intllcms/s/2
/82860a80-6dal-llde-8b19-00144feabdcO.html#axzzlZmGrL8av (describing dispute
between Facebook and rival Power.com over restrictions on scraping data off Facebook).
111. Facebook Exposed in Google Smear Campaign, BBC (May 12, 2011,21:24), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-13374048.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
113. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,456 (1993).
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In contrast, article 102 reaches both exploitive and exclusionary
abuses by a firm, but only after it has achieved a dominant position. 114
However, the difference is not always as great as the textual
differences would suggest. If anything, E.U. competition law
represents a greater threat to firms with substantial market shares.
Dominance for E.U. competition law purposes has been found with
as little as 40% market share of a relevant market and covers a
broader range of conduct than the current interpretation of section 2
of the Sherman Act by the U.S. Supreme Court." 5
Recent cases, settlements, and remedies in a variety of high-tech
industries suggest that the higher impact government investigation
and enforcement will likely take place in the European Union rather
than the United States.1 6 Once dominance is established, theories of
liability are more robust in the European Union in comparison to the
current restrictive application of section 2 by the Supreme Court.1 7
These include theories of bundling, predatory pricing, denial of access
to essential facilities, and a general duty of a dominant firm not to
abuse its dominance, which are unknown, or much more narrowly
interpreted, in modern U.S. antitrust law."' In addition, the E.U.
114. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
supra note 16, at art. 102.
115. See, e.g., Case T-219/99, British Airways plc v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-5917,
211, 223-25, 4 C.M.L.R. 19, $ 211, 223-25 (finding dominance for respondent despite
current market share just under 40% and declining in recent years); see also Enforcement
Priorities, supra note 13, at 8-9 (explaining the European Union's position that a 40%
percent market share may be considered a dominant position and describing the conduct
the Commission considers monopolistic).
116. Spencer Weber Waller & William Tasch, Harmonizing Essential Facilities, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 741,745-52 (2010).
117. See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 456 (2009)
(dismissing price squeeze allegation); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409-11 (2004) (dismissing unilateral refusal to deal); Brooke
Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 243 (1993) (dismissing
predatory pricing claim).
118. See, e.g., Case C-202/07, France T6lcom SA v. Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 1-2369,
1-2, 4 C.M.L.R. 25, 1-2, 4 (examining predatory pricing practices as possible abuse
of a dominant position); Case T-210/01, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-5575,
$ 15, 732 (concluding General Electric abused its dominant position through bundling
practices); British Airways, 2003 E.C.R. IT 211, 223-25, 4 C.M.L.R. $ 211, 223-25
(concluding British Airways occupied and abused a dominant position); Case T-203/01,
Michelin v. Comm'n (Michelin 11), 2003 E.C.R. 11-407, 307-12 (imposing penalties for
abuse of a dominant position); DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW,
MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION 186 (2010) (explaining the special responsibility in the
European Union not to abuse power); Waller & Tasch, supra note 116, at 745-52
(analyzing expanded use of essential facilities doctrine in the European Union and
member states); Press Release, European Comm'n, High Speed Internet: The Commission
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member nations have the right to apply article 102 more expansively
in their national competition legislation, raising the prospect of
investigation and challenge on even broader grounds. 119 At the same
time, the existence of a more robust private right of action, jury trials,
broad discovery, the lure of treble damages, and what remains of the
class action remedy, suggest that these actions may yet be tested in
U.S. courts, particularly in private treble damage litigation by
competitors or by consumers.
One possible real world scenario for Facebook, or future
dominant social networking sites, is an antitrust challenge based on
the maintenance of its dominant position through its role as a
platform for software applications developed by third-party software
companies. The so-called application barrier to entry was a key
component of the finding of monopoly power in the 2001 case United
States v. Microsoft.120 Windows as an operating system was able to
maintain its market power since developers overwhelmingly wrote
their programs to run on Windows and were less likely to support
other operating systems.' Similarly, other operating systems had
difficulty gaining market share without a full range of application
programs that would run on their operating system.
The case hinged on what further unlawful anticompetitive
behavior Microsoft engaged in to maintain market power. The court
identified a number of exclusive contracts, changes to products and
services that only disadvantaged competitors (rather than helping
users), and certain patterns of deceptions that further locked in
purchasers, users, and programmers."
Facebook, for the foreseeable future, is in a different situation
than the Microsoft of a decade ago or Google today. It is less likely to
use restrictions on application developers to maintain its dominance
Imposes a Fine on Wanadoo for Abuse of a Dominant Position (July 16, 2003), available
at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/1025&format=HTML
&aged-l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; (explaining imposition of a fine after finding
high speed internet company abused dominant position).
119. Council Regulation 1/2003, of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the
Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L1) 1, 1-
5 (EC). Articles 81 and 82 have been renumbered as Articles 101 and 102, respectively, in
the founding treaty for the European Union. Application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
(Formerly Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty), EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/legislation
summaries/competition/firms/126092_en.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2011).
120. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
121. Id. at 60-62.
122. Id. at 70-78; David Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet
Economy, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 285, 304 (2008), http://colloquy.law
.northwestern.edumain/2008/05/anti-trust-issue.html.
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over the platform, since it is not itself an application developer and
benefits from more applications and developers available to its user
base. 123
Another possible issue down the road is the issue of tying and
bundling that plagued Microsoft and is beginning to be raised in
connection with Google's role in search. Google's continuing addition
of new free features such as Google Maps, Google News, and Google
Travel has competition implications for competitors who provide
competing products. Here too, the outcome in the United States may
differ from the outcome in the European Union and other key
jurisdictions. Each time new features are incorporated into existing
dominant platform software, less integrated competitors are harmed.
Consumers are also potentially harmed as well by the diminution of
choice and the possible exclusion of better options.
The U.S. courts have tread lightly in this area and have been
reluctant to impose liability for such conduct. Despite affirming
liability against Microsoft on most counts, the D.C. Circuit was quite
deferential to the company's design choices. The appellate court
refused to hold the company liable for tying internet browsing
software to the basic operating system absent a full rule of reason
analysis, 124 which the Government chose not to pursue on remand. As
to bundling, a handful of courts in the United States have affirmed
liability for bundling, but have done so in non-software industries and
under circumstances far removed from the integration of new features
into dominant software platforms. 125
Bundling of new features, even for free, becomes grounds for
scrutiny outside the United States where competition from less
integrated competitors is harmed. The European version of the
Microsoft case, Microsoft Corp. v. Commissioner,126 focused directly
on the bundling of media-playing software with the operating system
and required the unbundling of this feature as part of the remedy. 2
Facebook may face similar bundling scrutiny in the European Union
123. Butts, supra note 62, at 290.
124. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 84. For a full analysis of the development and nature of
modern rule of reason analysis in U.S. antitrust, see generally Spencer Weber Waller,
Justice Stevens and the Rule of Reason, 62 SMU L. REV. 693 (2009).
125. See, e.g., LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 154-56 (3d Cir. 2003); Ortho
Diagnostics Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 465-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
126. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601.
127. Id. 859-72, 1232. The failure of the particular remedy chosen by the European
Commission is discussed in Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of
Monopolization Remedies, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 11, 28 (2009).
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as it incorporates a plethora of new software features into its basic
platform.
While Facebook may be less vulnerable than Microsoft or
Google to some of the charges of anticompetitive conduct that have
come to characterize the computer software industry, it faces its own
unique challenge over the control of information that has defined its
dominance in the present social networking industry. If Facebook's
market dominance remains durable, the question of market power
becomes easier over time as network effects and data lock-in make it
increasingly likely that Facebook is a market unto itself. Any changes
in information and data policy that harm competition become serious
matters of concern, as do changes in behavior or policies that make
access or interoperability more difficult for present and future
competitors and application developers. Here, U.S. and E.U.
competition law and policy is more in sync. Each jurisdiction required
in the Microsoft case and other monopolization cases interoperability
requirements as a remedy for the unlawful maintenance of a
monopoly or the abuse of a dominant position.1 28
More speculatively, Facebook (or some future dominant social
networking site) may evolve into the type of infrastructure that
requires open access to both consumers and competitors at fair,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory prices and other terms. 129 From
medieval times through the present, a number of businesses have
been deemed to affect the public interest and then regulated as
common carriers. 130 In the antitrust realm, denial of access to
competitors under certain circumstances has been considered a
violation of the essential facilities doctrine and a violation of sections
1 or 2 of the Sherman Act when the other elements of the violation
are present."' As I have discussed in other work, the essential
128. Waller, supra note 1.
129. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and
Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 974-78 (2005); Brett Frischmann &
Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 10-18
(2008); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257,
282-83 (2007); Spencer Weber Waller, Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities, 2008 WIS.
L. REV. 359, 371-85; Wailer & Tasch, supra note 116, at 762-66.
130. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 279-323 (1998). Such concerns have
led Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale to call for the creation of a Federal Search
Commission to explicitly regulate internet search. Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal
Search Commission? Fairness, Access, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1208-09 (2008).
131. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368, 378-82 (1973)
(requiring vertically integrated utility to wheel power from competing generator to
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facilities doctrine works best when applied to denials of access to
historical and modern infrastructure, whether that consists of railroad
bridges, telephone networks, or software platforms. 132 The more
Facebook resembles the infrastructure of the future, the more it will
be treated as such for competition law purposes. Either separately or
in combination, these are major factors that could create the perfect
antitrust storm for this market leader.
IV. FACEBOOK AND REAL SCHUMPETERIAN COMPETITION
Thinking about the antitrust law implications of social
networking also provides a lens to examine the nature of competition
and public policy more generally. The Austrian economic historian
Joseph Schumpeter coined the term "Creative Destruction" to
represent his findings as to the nature of competition in nineteenth
and early twentieth century markets.'33 For Schumpeter, competition
consisted of one dominant firm being replaced by another, and then
yet another new dominant firm. Firms thus tended to compete for
market dominance in existing and newly created industries through
innovation and other highly disruptive strategies.1 4 This is a very
different vision than competition (largely based on price) within well-
defined markets that dominates most microeconomic thinking and
public policy based on price theory.'35 This vision of competition is
downstream customers); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1945)
(holding newspaper network must admit competitors of members on a nondiscriminatory
basis); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 409 (1912)
(ordering group controlling railroad traffic across the Mississippi River to provide access
to nonmembers on a nondiscriminatory basis); MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708
F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring local phone monopolist to provide
interconnection to competing long distance provider).
132. Frischmann & Waller, supra note 129, at 22-28, 46-64; Waller, supra note 129, at
375-85; Waller & Tasch, supra note 116, at 762-66; see also Frischmann, supra note 129, at
961-70 (developing economic theory of infrastructure and management of infrastructure
as commons); Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 129, at 258-71 (discussing the analogous
concepts of spillovers and positive externalities and arguing that spillovers produce net
benefits in the intellectual property field, despite the traditional law and economics theory
that spillovers cause market inefficiencies); Sandeep Vaheesan, Reviving an Epithet: A
New Way Forward for the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 911, 951-59
(urging application of essential facilities to unregulated software platforms).
133. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed.
1950). See generally THOMAS K. MCGRAW, PROPHET OF INNOVATION: JOSEPH
SCHUMPETER AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION (2007) (providing a scholarly biography of
the life and work of Schumpeter).
134. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 133, at 83-86.
135. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 15-18 (3d ed. 1990).
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more similar to what a number of commentators have referred to as
competition for the market, rather than within the market. '36
Commentators such as Richard Posner have applied this vision
to newer high-tech industries where the prospect of monopoly returns
drives competition in innovation. 3 7 More generally, commentators
debate whether monopoly or competition is more conducive to
innovation and what is the proper public policy to encourage
innovation as an engine of growth.
13 8
Until recently, the social networking space has shown a high
degree of contestability, suggesting that it shares in common much of
the Schumpeterian vision of competition via successive waves of
creative destruction. Early on, Friendster was the dominant firm, then
MySpace, and now Facebook. We have seen the exit or irrelevance of
venerable sites such as Propeller, Digg, and Google's previous
failures to launch prior social networking sites such as Buzz. 39 In
addition, we have the evolving nature of social networking sites in
general, which are quickly converging with formerly separate
software applications such as search, email, music streaming, video
chat, and instant messaging.140 As a result of these and other
136. See Adi Ayal, Monopolization Via Voluntary Network Effects, 76 ANTITRUST L.J.
799, 800, 812-14 (2010); David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Some Economic Aspects
of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY
AND THE ECONOMY 1, 1 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, eds., 2002).
137. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925,929-30
(2001).
138. For discussions by prominent commentators who find competitive markets a more
reliable generator of innovation, see KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RISK BEARING 144, 157 (3d ed. 1976); Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow:
How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 587-88 (2007); Robert Pitofsky,
Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual
Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 916-18 (2001). While this debate remains unsettled and
is probably incapable of definitive resolution, most would agree with Professor Herbert
Hovenkamp who stated that: "Many antitrust violations restrain rather than promote
innovation." Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Schumpeterian Competition and Antitrust 4 (Univ. of
Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper, Paper No. 08-83, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1275986.
139. See, e.g., Todd Wasserman, Can Digg Find Its Way in the Crowd?, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2010, at BU1; Bob Brown, AOL Shuts Down Propeller Social News Aggregation,
COMPUTERWORLDUK (Oct. 1, 2010, 11:46), http://www.computerworlduk.com/news
/it-business/3241977/aol-shuts-down-propeller-social-news-aggregation/.
140. See AULETTA, supra note 50, at 172-73 (discussing Facebook acting as search
engine and navigator in competition with Google); Amir Efrati, Google Wants Search To
Be More Social, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2011, at B1; Brendan Lynch, Facebook vs. Google+,
BOS. HERALD, Sept. 23, 2011, at 3; Facebook Revamps Messaging System, BBC (Nov. 15,
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11743524; David Meyer, EU Highlights
Difficulty of Establishing Online Antitrust, ZDNET (July 8, 2010, 17:14),
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unforeseen factors, it is entirely possible that Facebook will be
replaced with another social networking site or an altogether new
technology or software platform.
The question remains as to what is the preferable public policy so
that Facebook, and any present or future rivals, can compete on the
merits and prevail or fail based on consumer demands, rather than
exclusionary practices or governmental dictates. Many have suggested
laissez faire as the proper policy complement to Schumpeterian
competition. 41 This Article suggests that the answer is somewhat
more complicated.
First, Schumpeter himself did not advocate the complete absence
of a government role in the formulation of competition policy. Over
his long and prolific career, the bulk of his writing consisted of an
historical analysis of economic thought and actual market behavior in
the many industries and macroeconomic cycles that he studied.142 As
his most recent biographer has noted, he typically avoided prescribing
economic programs for governments.'43 Where he addressed these
themes, he was not always opposed to state intervention, but was
most concerned about the importance of innovation and avoiding
attacks on big business per se.'" At different times in his career, he
http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/regulation/2010/07/08/eu-highlights-difficulty-of-establishing-
online-antitrust-40089482/ (discussing the "contestability" of social networking and online
markets); Alexei Oreskovic, Microsoft Deepens Facebook Ties in Web Search Battle,
REUTERS (Oct. 14, 2010, 1:44 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/14/us-
microsoft-idUSTRE69C5MW20101014; Wailin Wong, Facebook To Team Up with Skype
To Offer Video Calling, CHI. TRIB. (July 6, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-
07-06/business/chi-facebook-to-team-up-with-skype-to-offer-video-calling-
20110706_1_skype-chief-executive-mark-zuckerberg-social-networking-platform.
141. See, e.g., Arthur M. Diamond, Jr., Creative Destruction: The Essential Fact About
Capitalism 31 (June 6, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www
.artdiamond.com/DiamondPDFs/CreativeDestructionEssentialFact03.pdf.
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was critical of monopoly, opposed public entry barriers, and found
inequality of opportunity unacceptable. 4 '
Finally, he did consider a world where would-be monopolists
could achieve market power and then take action to prevent the next
wave of creative destruction from affecting them. As Schumpeter
noted in his History of Economic Analysis: "[T]here are means
available to the successful entrepreneur-patents, 'strategy,' and so
on-for prolonging the life of his monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic
position and for rendering it more difficult for competitors to close up
on him." '146
The recent past suggests that firms with market power in the
technology space often engage in a variety of tactics to prevent the
second wave of creative destruction from ever occurring. While
reasonable people can differ as to whether Schumpeterian
competition produces an optimal amount of innovation, competition,
or social welfare,'147 even a true Schumpeterian should be concerned
about a world where open competition in stage one leads to durable
market power in stage two. Most commentators would be concerned
when governmental processes and entry barriers are used to bolster
monopoly power, even if lawfully obtained. 4 8 Current antitrust policy
should be similarly concerned with private action that unlawfully
maintains monopoly power, even when being quite lenient or
encouraging to the acquisition of that power in the first place.
This is largely the antitrust world in which we live today and it is
an appropriate one. 149 It is appropriate to insist on rigorous definition
of market power before proceeding to the question of identifying
exclusionary and harmful behavior that inappropriately maintains this
145. MCGRAW, supra note 133, at 175-76,481,502.
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can prevent creative destruction).
147. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 609-10 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research ed., 1962); Baker, supra note
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148. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 347-64 (1978); MCGRAW,
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149. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam) (upholding antitrust liability for a manufacturer of a personal computer operating
system and an internet web browser for engaging in anticompetitive practices to maintain
market power); Decision and Order, In re Intel Corp., No. 9341 (F.T.C. Oct. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/101102inteldo.pdf (settling claims brought
against Intel Corp. for the use of anticompetitive measures to maintain market power).
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power and blocks the emergence of even more disruptive
technologies and other forms of innovation. Where monopoly has
been achieved unlawfully, that too should be addressed. However, the
mere fact that true monopoly power has been achieved lawfully,
whether through innovation, creative destruction, or merely dumb
luck, does not counsel in favor of a policy of laissez faire from that
point forward. The focus should not be on size, but on the abuse of
power. This may be inconvenient for the firms that currently
dominate high technology industries, but such rules are the very point
of meaningful competition policy.
While Judge Learned Hand was undoubtedly correct when he
wrote in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America15° that "[t]he
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be
turned upon when he wins, 151 it is equally important that we do not
allow the current frontrunner in a race to declare permanent victory
at the moment of his choosing. As Professor Tim Wu has noted more
recently, the government has too often "stood beside concentrated
power against the underdog at the expense of economic
dynamism."' 52 Both wise antitrust and regulatory policy may be
needed to prevent markets from being won through innovation, but
maintained through capture and predation.
CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to describe a framework to analyze whether
Facebook, or any future dominant social networking firm, is a
monopolist and whether such firms have abused their power to
monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or abuse a dominant position
within the meaning of competition law and policy. The current
answer is probably no, or at least not yet. Under conventional
antitrust analysis, Facebook does not have the dominant market share
of well-defined product and geographic markets with high entry
barriers that normally constitute evidence of the market power prong
of monopolization and abuse of dominance. However, network
effects, evidence of lock-in, limitations on data portability, and
common sense all suggest that the question is a close one and that
Facebook's market power is growing, rather than receding.
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Since the market and the competitive strategies continue to
evolve so quickly and in unexpected directions, the framework for
analysis is probably more important than the snapshot at any
particular instant. Social networking, even more than internet search,
is likely to be one of the areas where traditional notions of market
power give way before the reality that even though choice is
available, it is not a meaningful option for most consumers for a
variety of reasons. Even committed admirers of theories of creative
waves of destruction should be wary of a complete hands-off
competition policy toward the market leaders of today, lest the open
markets of the present become the entrenched monopolies of the
future.
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